Populist politics aims not only at implementing a policy agenda, but also at transforming political culture at large. Javier Milei is certainly a populist in this regard. Like previous leaders of this kind in Argentine history, such as Hipólito Yrigoyen in the 1910s and Juan Perón in the 1940s, Milei wants to fundamentally change Argentina. But unlike his predecessors, he wants to do it from the right. Will he succeed? Based on recent history in Argentine politics, it seems unlikely that Milei will achieve his stated goals of lasting macroeconomic stability and dramatic reduction of the public sector. However, his best shot at producing a lasting social transformation consists in preserving the ambivalence of his ideological orientation. In this regard, he is no different from previous populist leaders, though his right-wing vision certainly is.
In order to understand the nature of Milei’s innovation, we have to consider the unusual ideological alignments of Argentine politics. Instead of divisions along the left-right spectrum characteristic of most countries, Argentina has typically had a populist and a non- (and often anti-) populist pole. The populist pole, which since the 1940s mostly coincided with Peronism, was ideologically oriented to political and economic pragmatism, strong leadership, and mass mobilization. The non-populist pole was ideologically oriented to rule-based politics and economics, respect for political institutions, and more procedural forms of political participation. Both poles contained left- and right-wing tendencies, which often led to unexpected shifts in ideological positions within one and the other. Peronism had been mostly associated with economic redistribution in favor of the working class since the 1940s, then it became the party of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s with Carlos Menem, and finally it shifted to a clear left-wing economic and social agenda in the 2000s and 2010s with Néstor and Cristina Kirchner.
Until the 2010s, right-wing ideologies had no clear place in the political field in Argentina. Generally and comparatively speaking, Argentines tend to agree with the idea of a strong public sector that actively fosters economic redistribution, and no major political party had put market-based economics at the core of its agenda. In the 1990s, after campaigning strongly on redistributionist ideas, Peronist president Carlos Menem unexpectedly turned to neoliberal economic reforms in an attempt, which proved successful in the short run, to end hyperinflation and achieve macroeconomic stability. However, this ideological shift turned out to be temporary, as Peronism switched back to State-centered redistributionist policies in the 2000s. During those years, business owner Mauricio Macri founded a new center-right political party, Propuesta Republicana, which grew from the City of Buenos Aires to the rest of the country until winning the presidential elections in 2015. Although decidedly pro-market, Propuesta Republicana presented itself as a moderate political force, with an agenda of efficient management (as opposed to drastic reduction) of the State, fighting against corruption and respect for institutional procedures.
Against this background, Milei’s party, La Libertad Avanza, is the first decidedly, unapologetic major right-wing political party in modern Argentine history. As his supporters often point out, 2023 represents the first presidential election in Argentina in which a candidate wins with an explicit agenda of gutting the public sector. Milei and his followers interpret this as a cultural transformation: for the first time, the right has an opportunity to implement the radical economic reforms required to achieve long-term macroeconomic stability not against the will of the majority of voters but rather backed by it. If they are successful in drastically reducing the public sector and dismantling the welfare state, they believe, this cultural transformation will become permanent, as more and more people will need to adapt to the rules of a market economy. Thus, Milei’s followers often describe their project as a “cultural battle”—a term that, ironically, is associated with the work of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, and which was also popular during Kirchnerism. They believe that there is a unique ideological context that makes possible a radical economic transformation, which will in turn reinforce the cultural change and make it permanent. Like previous populist projects, Milei’s economic agenda is linked to a larger transformation of society, without which this agenda cannot hold.
It is of course uncertain whether this radical transformation is possible. The conditions for populist movements are often an effect of structural changes that produce a mismatch between society and political elites, leading to the idea that the people needs to take power back from them. In one of the first and most classical sociological studies of the emergence of Peronism, Argentine sociologist Gino Germani argued that Perón’s base was composed largely of internal migrants who had left agricultural regions to find new jobs in industrial areas. There are indications that many of Milei’s strongest supporters are young people who work in informal sectors, especially those “entrepreneurs” selling their labor or products through apps. It might be the case that structural social changes have produced a new constituency of lower-income voters who see the State as an obstacle or a threat rather than as a source of care and opportunity for social mobility. But it is also possible that the appeal of libertarian ideas that made possible Milei’s victory in 2023 will vanish if he is unable to provide the economic stability and growth that most Argentines long for after more than a decade of growing inflation and stagnation.
Milei is well aware of this, which is why his populism remains ambivalent. The core idea with which he campaigned in 2023 was the struggle against “the caste,” a vague concept that referred to traditional political elites, but which he and his followers often use more expansively for anyone who profits from the public sector. Like most populists, Milei makes the dividing line between the people, which he refers to as “decent Argentines” (argentinos de bien), and the self-interested elites ambiguous. This makes room for adaptation: when on the offensive, Milei associates a certain group with the caste. For example, when he accused public universities of mismanaging public funds, as part of his plan to reduce their funding, his supporters circulated the idea of a “university caste.” Sometimes the accusation is more implicit, as when they claimed that Hospital Garrahan, a top-of-its-class children’s hospital, was full of “ñoquis,” a colloquial word that refers to public employees who never show up to work. When on the defense, by contrast, “the caste” is narrowed down to traditional politicians. In this regard, Milei follows a conventional populist script, which creates a strong dichotomy between the people and its enemies, but makes the dividing line between one and the other undefinable and fluctuating.
This malleability, however, has limits. Populist leaders often face a backlash against their most radical policies, at which point they must strategically back down. But backing down has its own perils, since they draw much of their electoral appeal from the idea that they are disruptors who are fighting against an entrenched elite. This aura of disruption is particularly important for exciting and mobilizing their most hardcore supporters. As populist leaders start sounding less extreme, they become more tolerable to moderate voters, but they also become less distinctive. Recently, in the face of prolonged economic hardship and a more unified political opposition, many relevant political and economic players have pressured Milei to tone down confrontation and make room for political compromise. To some extent, he has yielded to this pressure. This is evident in two major shifts in his campaign during the midterm elections in October 2025, compared with 2023: first, the main target of his attacks was no longer “the caste,” broadly understood as all traditional politicians, but rather Kirchnerism; second, he did not focus on gutting the State at all costs, but instead asked for patience for his macroeconomic reforms to translate into growth, and thus into economic well-being. This strategy has inspired more trust among potential political and economic allies. At the same time, however, Milei started to sound more like a traditional politician, which risked hurting the appeal that led him to power. This is probably why he staged an extremely unconventional rock concert, where he sang, in a very out-of-tune fashion, a series of classic music hits from Argentina. The aim was likely to preserve some of his image as an outsider who does not play by the rules of normal politics.
The strategy seems to have paid off so far. Unexpectedly, La Libertad Avanza beat both Peronism and third parties in all the main districts (including the City of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Córdoba, Mendoza, and, shockingly, the state of Buenos Aires, which is the stronghold of Peronism) in the midterms. Political analysts agree that the victory reflects a longing for stability and an aversion to going back to the economic uncertainty of the past, largely associated with Peronism, rather than widespread enthusiasm for Milei’s agenda. Therefore, while on the one hand Milei has regained momentum for unfolding his transformational plans, on the other there are signals that his support by voters depends on both economic stability (including, above all, relatively low inflation) and weakness of the opposition. Both factors might rapidly change due to unexpected circumstances that are out of Milei’s control—as happened to President Macri after his impressive victory in the midterms of 2019. So far, during the last few weeks, Milei has stuck to a slightly more moderate script, establishing amicable relations with parts of the opposition while reserving his attacks for Peronists, such as the governor of the state of Buenos Aires, Axel Kicillof. But with a stagnant economy that has required two bailouts by the IMF and by the U.S. Treasury just this year, it is likely that Milei will face new unexpected challenges that will call for further changes in his approach.
One way Milei can adapt his populist style to changing circumstances is simply to change focus. If his radical anti-State agenda starts facing a backlash, Milei can intensify cultural politics, such as the critique of feminism and gender politics, the reinforcement of traditional values, and the unyielding international alignment with “the West”—represented, in his view, by the United States and Israel. Like similar right-wing populist leaders, such as Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro, Milei has attempted this in the past, but with meager benefits. After his speech at the Davos Forum in January 2025, where he explicitly associated homosexuality with pedophilia, thousands of people gathered on the streets to demonstrate against it, while few prominent voices stood to defend him. So far, the core appeal of Milei’s populism seems to be circumscribed by its economic aspects, and so his capacity to stretch it to other ideological terrains seems limited.
Consequently, it would seem that the future of right-wing populism in Argentina is tied to its economic success. Unlike in the past, many Argentines are now open to a radically market-friendly solution to the longstanding woes of economic instability and endemic inflation. While this is certainly a significant change of attitude, it does not necessarily mean that they are generally willing to give up on public education, universal healthcare, public investment in infrastructure, and other targets of Milei’s libertarian ideology. If his “cultural battle” is to succeed, it will need to be towed by durable economic benefits that lead people to believe that big sacrifices are worth it. However, the confrontational, winner-takes-all approach characteristic of populist politics may be detrimental to this goal. The Argentine economy has deep structural problems that require carefully planned solutions, backed by broad political and economic support. Milei’s attempt to fundamentally change the economy by overwhelming opposition in one swift stroke has paid off so far, but it is likely to hit the same obstacles it faced in the past—as was already the case, for example, with the government’s inability to sustain the exchange rate between the peso and the U.S. dollar, which led to the unexpected bailout by the United States Treasury.
The success of Milei’s populism will depend on his capacity to preserve its ambivalence. In this regard, Milei is no different from other politicians of his kind, for populism needs ambivalence to thrive. If a populist leader fixes the dividing line between the people and the elites, the movement loses its ability to adapt to the changing circumstances of the political field in a democracy, and thus it either becomes authoritarian (if it eliminates democracy) or narrows the scope of its appeal. If it blurs this dividing line too much, it starts to assimilate to traditional politics and loses momentum. How much room for maneuver does Milei have? Are Argentines generally more receptive to this new kind of right-wing populism, or is this rather a brief ideological window that will rapidly close if economic expectations are disappointed? The answer is surely somewhere in the middle. The only certainty is that Milei’s project of turning right-wing populism into a lasting transformational force in Argentina will depend on his capacity to preserve and strategically profit from its ideological ambivalence.
Topics: Reflections & Dialogues
Javier Burdman is Research Fellow at the Argentine National Research Council (CONICET) and Invited Professor at Torcuato Di Tella University in Buenos Aires. He specializes in modern and contemporary political theory.